These are the sorts of questions that Jonathan Fennell, senior lecturer at King’s College, London, seeks to answer in this outstanding new book, which looks at experiences of the citizen armies of Britain, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa in World War II. As Fennell makes clear, in those countries there was much less enthusiasm for World War II than for World War I. In the first two years of World War I, 307,966 Australian men voluntarily enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) from a population of barely five million. In the first two years of World War II, total enlistments in the Second AIF, from a population of seven million, amounted to 188,587.

Britain and the Commonwealth countries responded to this problem in varying ways. Britain and New Zealand promptly brought in conscription. This was not necessary in India where, with its huge population, sufficient volunteers could be found to join the army for its economic benefits. In Canada, the French-speaking population had little enthusiasm for the war, and conscription for service overseas would have split the country. With its large Afrikaner population, many of whom opposed the war, South Africa never resorted to conscription; by the last year, the Union had trouble maintaining its sole fighting division. Australia relied on volunteers for overseas service, but introduced conscription for home service at the beginning of the war. This meant that conscripts could fight in the Australian territory of New Guinea; later the conscripts fought further afield.

Jonathan Fennell

Whether the soldiers were conscripts or volunteers, they generally came from the lower socio-economic levels of their societies. They were the same men who had suffered in the Depression; acutely aware that they were being asked to shoulder a more onerous burden than civilians at home, they were determined that they should be fighting for a better future. This attitude was highlighted by the so-called ‘Furlough Mutiny’ in New Zealand. In mid-1943 almost 6,000 New Zealand soldiers serving in the Mediterranean returned to New Zealand on furlough. There they discovered that ‘wharfies’ earned far more than they did and that 3,500 men who were eligible for war service were kept at home because they held jobs in ‘essential industries’. Most of these soldiers refused to return to the war; only thirteen per cent of the original furlough party embarked for the return voyage. The remainder were court-martialled and dishonourably discharged. Fennell calls it ‘the most severe outbreak of indiscipline in any British or Commonwealth force in both world wars’.

Reflecting the attitude in New Zealand, in 1944 and 1945 the British and Commonwealth armies struggled to maintain their numbers. As Fennell puts it, this manpower crisis was not just a product of demographic limitations or the problems of balancing the requirements of armies against wartime economies, ‘but also a manifestation of the continued inability of Britain and the Empire to mobilise and enthuse its citizen armies … to serve with the unswerving commitment and self-discipline required’.

Throughout the war, Army authorities censored soldiers’ letters to remove any information that might have been useful to the enemy. This censorship also enabled the authorities to gauge the morale of the soldiers and to pinpoint causes of discontent. Fennell has used the censorship summaries, based on seventeen million letters, to gain an insight into the thinking of the soldiers during the war.

Soldiers’ morale was affected by a series of influences. The first was the tactical ability of their commanders. Fennell shows how, after early defeats, commanders slowly reshaped their tactics, so that, with appropriate training, their soldiers were at last able to win on the battlefield. For instance, the Australian Army under General Sir Thomas Blamey developed tactics and organisations that were suitable for jungle warfare in New Guinea.

Another cause of low morale was incompetent junior officers. In response, the British Army introduced a selection process that not only produced better officers but encouraged more soldiers to apply for officer training because the selection system no longer relied on class or the old school tie. A variant of this process is still in use in the Australian Army today. Similarly, psychologists tested soldiers to ensure that they were employed in the most suitable occupations. Further, soldiers needed to feel that they were fighting for a purpose. The British and Commonwealth armies employed education officers to lead unit discussions about current affairs and to circulate current affairs bulletins. The psychology and education corps, now important parts of the Australian Army, were formed at this time.

When the censorship summaries showed that the soldiers were disgruntled about conditions, the army introduced canteens, mobile bath units, and other amenities. General Ronald Forbes Adam, the British Army’s adjutant-general and one of the unsung heroes of the war, aimed to make the Army an institution ‘more careful of human values, more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the ordinary soldiers and more democratic in spirit’.

Fennell sets these issues against succinct accounts of all the major campaigns conducted by the British and Commonwealth armies, revealing how they developed new tactics and responded to the challenges of maintaining morale and fighting spirit. With numerous campaigns and battles to analyse, the book is long, but it is worth the effort. It is deeply researched in the archives of the respective countries and uses the latest scholarship to make wise and balanced judgements about the performances of the armies in their many battles.

Inevitably, in covering such a broad canvas the author cannot be expert on everything. Referring to political problems in Australia, Fennell claims that the government and the opposition could not find ‘a way to work effectively together in the national interest’. He overlooks the Advisory War Council, where government and opposition leaders sat together. Through his membership of this council, John Curtin was better prepared for the time when he became prime minister in 1940. Further, Fennell accepts the old canard that Curtin insisted on the 1st Australian Corps returning from the Middle East. In truth, it was Winston Churchill who suggested the divisions go to the Far East; Curtin insisted that they be diverted to Australia rather than to Burma.

This is an engrossing book that should cause scholars to rethink their approach to the study of Britain and the Commonwealth countries in World War II. It should spur Australian scholars to re-examine Australia’s role in that war.