Dr Andrews contends in his introduction that Australia has always had a foreign policy which has, to a greater or lesser extent, reflected the specific interests of Australia, even though in an historical context this has meant trying to influence an ally to adopt a policy which met her national needs as well as those of its powerful friends.

This aspect of foreign policy is central to the thesis advanced in this study, because Australia’s adaptation to changes in its strategic environment has periodically proved necessary. Thus in 1908, in a first show of concern about changes in great power relationships, the Australian Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, sought to influence British policy in the wake of the withdrawal of British naval power from the Pacific. But as the twentieth century has unfolded, against a background of increased turbulence, fragmentation of great Empires, the emergence of a plurality of states within the Third World, the onward rush of military technology and scientific innovation, Australian governments have shifted the basis of foreign policy towards greater national self-reliance and independence. And yet such independence has to be greatly qualified in an interdependent world within which nation-states are so easily penetrated by both state and non-state actors alike.

The great merit of this book is the attempt to relate the evolution of Australian foreign policy to the military and strategic changes brought by the two great wars of this century. Dr Andrews avoids the error of attempting to separate diplomatic history from the considerations of military matters. As he trenchantly observes in this connexion: ‘Those who write on Australian foreign policy omit the wars as if foreign policy ended with those events, and military historians avoid diplomatic history, writing instead somewhat nationalistic accounts of the heroism of men and units and ignoring what they were fighting for’. The enormous impact of two world wars figures largely in this book and therefore underscores the author’s attempt to integrate both diplomatic and military events as they affected both the domestic and external environments which help shape Australia’s foreign policy.

This book quite rightly shuns the intricacies of the policy making process and the structural factors affecting the bureaucratic input to foreign policy making and concentrates on the role of leading politicians, their opinions, and their activities. With the judicious use of historical documents and narrative history, this book manages to convey the major issues of foreign policy from the nineteenth century to the complex polycentric world of today.

The important and overriding search for security in the nineteenth century is well illustrated through the great invasion scares which gripped Australian political élites and which required guarantees from the British government that Australia would be defended against external attack. Australia perceived the need for a sustained British maritime strategy. And insofar as this was effective, then, Australia remained strategically dependent upon Britain, though often truculently free to cajole and criticise the nature of British foreign policy as Australian interests dictated.

The book traces and describes shifts in policy arising from the aftermath of the first world war which did much to shatter great power relationships and fragment the balance of power in Europe, and force Australia towards a greater national independence. In a sense, both the great depression and the shattering and brutal events of the second world war made it inevitable and desirable for Australia to achieve a greater measure of autonomy in its foreign policy. Britain ceased to be the protector of Australia; and after the battle of the Coral Sea in 1942 America emerged as a super-power designate, with all the panoply of power. But as Dr Andrews contends, this shift away from great power dependence can never be complete. Australian interests will be increasingly rooted in a regional balance of power in which the national interests of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia as well as the ASEAN countries, will be increasingly significant.

I feel that the logic of the historic evolution of Australian foreign policy lies also at the heart of its defence policy; it is clear that Australia should in the 1980s enhance its defence effort and thereby reduce its dependence on external assistance. But by the same token, Australia should strengthen and improve the ANZUS pact and, in the reviewer’s opinion, strengthen the strategic nexus with the United States through the provision of operational bases in Australia for American intervention forces.

I believe that this book strengthens the view that Australia can and has historically wielded considerable influence over its major ally to the extent that it is prepared to demonstrate its will and capacity to be a friend. We should remember the old adage that to have a friend you need to be a friend and, in that context, an independent foreign policy for Australia must always be circumscribed by that strategic imperative. A totally isolated and neutral Australia could not, unlike Sweden, survive the threats and pressures which lie ahead. Both Japan and China will critically affect Australia’s strategic outlook for the remainder of this century and beyond. By following sensible policies both great powers should remain friendly to Australia within the wider framework of a regional balance of power. I strongly recommend this book.