This is about more than Kim Jong-un and his nuclear toys, although North Korea is one of several headline-grabbing regional hotspots Taylor surveys. It is also about more than Xi Jinping’s assertively ambiguous ‘Chinese Dream’ and trouble between Beijing and its neighbours, especially Taiwan, or Japan, or the smaller yet collectively significant nations of Southeast Asia. Nor is this solely a product of doubts about a US commitment to a role in Asia, given Donald Trump’s Twitter tirades and isolationist impulses.

Taylor’s warning is to see each of the region’s foaming disputes as part of a larger whole, connected rather than separate, each with the potential to cascade into something much more frightening: the prospect of a war between nations, with professional militaries, sophisticated hardware, and, in some cases, nuclear weapons or the potential to quickly develop them. This terrifying confluence makes for a stark contrast to the experience of deadly but relatively ragtag insurgent or terrorist-related conflicts that have been familiar in recent decades. In a sense, this warning against complacency borrows from the well-worn precept to hope for the best and plan for the worst. Taylor sets out a worst-case scenario for Asia that is difficult to refute precisely because it is the worst case.

Amid roiling regional tension, marked by resurgent nationalism, vexed history, and haughty leaders fearing the loss of prestige, the trigger for a wider conflict could be something as foolish as a drunk captain of a Chinese boat colliding with a Japanese coastguard ship, as happened in 2010 near the contested islands of the East China Sea, sparking renewed antagonism. The historical parallels can be easily found. Rewind just over a century, for example, to a Europe that also featured a series of separate yet related crises among emerging powers vying with established empires, and the assassination of an Austrian prince that set in motion a crippling conflict.

Is it a reasonable fear? Are Asia’s leaders truly so complacent and ignorant of experience? Or to ask the question in a different way, do the imaginings of potential strife offer the best guide to policy? This is always the dilemma. Could anticipating the nightmare, and responding pre-emptively, actually be self-fulfilling?

Taylor, mostly, is nimble enough to escape these traps by illustrating the steps taken so far that have led Asia to this point, and chartingthe logic for what might follow. Some features of regional tension are fixed in geography – crucial maritime passages for instance that will be constantly contested. Surprises will occur, and personalities will intrude. Taylor accounts for Trump’s unexpected diplomatic overtures towards North Korea and his break with the past practice of isolation by demonstrating the continued mismatch of goals within the United States and South Korea, as well as the past perfidy of Kim’s regime. The war game scenario he later sets out for a Chinese attack on Taiwan seems less convincing, if only because it is hypothetical and at odds with Taylor’s earlier observation about the inherent uncertainties in war, even if his overarching conclusions about the island’s changing generational attitudes are fascinating.

Ri Sol-ju, Kim Jong-un, Moon Jae-in, and Kim Jong-sook during the 2018 summit (Blue House [Republic of Korea], via Wikimedia Commons)

A laudable aspect of the book is Taylor’s effort to define key terminology. The ‘flashpoints’ he sets out to explain as regional disputes is a concept borrowed from the sciences, ‘the lowest temperature at which vapours from a liquid will ignite when exposed to a flame’. He later defines the ‘Mexican stand-off’ on the Korean peninsula with reference to popular film. This might seem semantic, but given the way particular phrases or terms are often pregnant with assumption in discussions of regional affairs, the potential for misunderstanding is great.

To demonstrate the point, China’s concept of ‘core’ interests is well covered in the context of Taiwan, as are more lyrical ideas, such as a ‘warm spring of friendship’ between China and Japan, or the ‘Sunshine policy’ between the Koreas (both since abandoned). Ensuring that everyone understands precisely what is at stake and what positions is held is crucial to effective diplomacy. Yet a weakness of much writing about the region is the liberal salt-and-pepper sprinkling of concepts such as ‘strategic partnership’,  ‘deepening relations’, or ‘hedge’ that are too often ill defined. Partly, this is a consequence of deliberately opaque stances by the countries involved, leaving others (Taylor refers throughout to ‘some commentators’) to debate true intentions.

The answer, inevitably, seems to return to wealth. Economics does not feature prominently in Taylor’s analysis, other than as the backdrop of China’s rise. Left aside are the persistent predictions of China’s impending financial collapse, perhaps because, as others have argued, short-term cycles of boom and bust won’t change the trajectory of China’s increasing global importance. The view that economic ties between countries will help moderate the prospect for conflict is mentioned and might have been further explored, although the manner in which jingoistic outbursts might quickly sweep aside economic links is demonstrated in discussion of Japan and China.

Brendan Taylor (photo via Black Inc.)The danger of uncorking the nationalist genie is the strongest theme in the book. Taylor draws in the heady historical context to the disputes covered, and nationalism, stoked by a sense of righting past wrongs, can be a potent way of rallying support for the flag. Yet this sometimes virulent sentiment is difficult to contain, and creates judgement that can rebound quickly and in unexpected way on leaders who fail to live up to expectations.

Whether Taylor’s prescriptions increase the prospect for peace really depends on the view of whether war is inevitable. For all the focus in recent years on China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea, Taylor sees this as the least combustible of the regional tensions, and a dispute the United States should leave alone rather than maintain ‘provocative’ policies. On the Korean peninsula, he wants the United States to preserve its military commitment, as well as to Japan, while allowing Taiwan, central to the dispute he fears most, to better stand alone.

Brendan Taylor has staked a position. Whether the future can truly be divined will be constantly debated, but Asia’s leaders cannot claim not to have been warned.