In ISIS: A history, Fawaz A. Gerges explains the emergence of ISIS as a direct consequence of the sectarian divisions unleashed by the invasion of Iraq, and for which the neo-conservative administration of George W. Bush bears ultimate responsibility. The misguided invasion was merely the first mistake among many, but any understanding of ISIS has to take into account the social, political, cultural, economic, and religious context of the Middle East considered as a whole.

One starting point for this discussion is understanding ISIS as an extension of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), itself the result of the US-led invasion of the country in 2003. Gerges pieces together an intriguing narrative that presents ISIS as a movement that owes much to the US-led invasion of Iraq and the postwar dismantling of state structures, and little to the charisma of its leaders. This is not a ‘great man’ theory of history, but one that rightly, in my opinion, places structural forces at the heart of its explanation.

A detailed examination of the Shia-dominated post-Saddam political establishment and its inability to nurture national identity allows Gerges to demonstrate the accelerated development of intercommunal distrust and a deepening of the Sunni–Shia divide. Beyond the borders of Iraq, attention is also paid to the breakdown of state institutions in Syria, its descent into full-blown war, as well as the consequences of the Arab Spring in neighbouring countries, particularly Egypt, to shed light on the conditions that fuel ISIS and help explain its emergence, development, and success.

In Iraq, the ideological commitment to the de-Baathification process that was initially introduced as an unofficial program and then turned into a permanent article of the constitution led to the destruction of state institutions and established a sectarian-based political system. Also, the US-led invasion entrenched the division of the country along Sunni–Shia lines and set the stage for a fierce, prolonged struggle driven by identity politics. The humiliating disbandment of the Iraqi army and the dismembering of state institutions also fueled anger against the United States, and for brief periods, united both Shia and Sunnis against a common enemy.

Nouri al-Maliki and George W. Bush, 2006 (photograph by Kimberlee Hewitt, Wikimedia Commons)

In his meticulously researched, beautifully written, and well-argued text, Gerges highlights how the de-Baathification program, combined with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s exclusion of Sunnis, provided fertile conditions for the emergence of ISIS out of al-Qaeda. ISIS’s success, Gerges argues, owes much to the legacy of Paul Bremer’s simplistic analogy of de-Baathification with the postwar denazification of Germany. This deprived the country of an officer class and the administrative cadres that had ruled under Saddam Hussein, leaving sectarian-based militias to fill the void. According to Gerges, some thirty per cent of the senior figures in ISIS’s military command are former army and police officers from the disbanded Iraqi security forces. It was the military expertise of these men that transformed the Sunni-based insurgent movement of Al Qaeda in Iraq into ISIS, ‘an effective fighting machine, combining urban guerilla warfare and conventional combat to deadly effect’.

Under the ferocious leadership of the self-styled caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the former Baathist officers controlled ISIS, albeit from behind the scenes. In the context of a collapsing security environment in both Iraq and Syria, the once-dominant but now threatened Sunnis adopted Salafi-jihadism as the default identity in the face of Iranian-dominated Shia regimes in Baghdad and Damascus, as well as a Kurdish revival in the north. Yet Gerges is not a one-dimensional thinker and argues that these historical default identities should not be equated only with religious fervour or commitment. Rather, Iraq, like other post-colonial states in the Arab world, has remained committed to traditional institutions at the expense of the development of a coherent nationalist project around which citizens could unite.

In addition, the power plays within jihadist groups are also a vital element of any explanation as evidenced by the vicious war of words and struggle for power that followed al-Baghdadi’s split from Ayman al-Zawahiri (Osama bin Laden’s successor as leader of Al Qaeda). Indeed, Gerges reminds us that ISIS in Syria initially gave priority to its conflicts with the Nusra Front and other opposition militias rather than against Assad’s forces. This is a significant and often overlooked, element of the dynamic that drives conflict in the Middle East as various groups emerge to claim the mantle of radical political Islam.

Importantly, both ISIS and Al Qaeda share the totalitarian impulse of the Islamicist movements that give priority to the ‘sovereignty of God’ over the will of the people. This destructive ideology, with its overt dictatorial qualities, holds that no individual, no family, nor community group has the right to govern: Allah is the one true ruler and the only holder of real sovereign power. As such, many in the West have failed to note how this is not only a conflict for control of the state and associated territory, but also represents a direct challenge to the Westphalian system of sovereign states.

The competition between Al Qaeda and ISIS continues to be played out by al-Baghdadi and Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, leader of the Nusra Front. Gerges deals with this issue in some detail and argues that it seems likely to strengthen Al Qaeda rather than ISIS. Unlike the Nusra Front, ISIS consider Islamists who take part in electoral politics to be apostates, thereby justifying their execution. Its extremism and violence, as with that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, eventually, alienates potential followers and will lead – with help from drones and air strikes – to the pseudo-Caliphate’s eventual extinction.

By contrast, Joulani and his barely visible Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri can be seen to be playing the long game and present themselves as the more rational wing of the global jihadist movement. How times had changed when a movement that was once viewed as the most radical and extreme jihadist group in the world now seems tame when compared to the violent extremes of ISIS.

With prospects for meaningful change in the region slim and the circumstances that enabled ISIS still mostly in place, is the group here to stay? ISIS has pushed the binary worldview of jihadism to new extremes. Increasingly fragmented from within and devoid of theological backing, the organisation relies solely on violence, with little to offer by way of a peaceful future. The divisions within the organisation are undeniable, and its supposed military invincibility has been exposed as a myth. Its long-term future is far from certain.

Written and argued with admirable clarity, ISIS: A history is a significant book with clear appeal beyond academic, diplomatic, and policy-making circles. This is a highly recommended volume and one that sets the standard for those interested in understanding the phenomenon we have come to know as ISIS.