Many factors account for this new prosperity, chiefly a strong centralised government, a vast pool of cheap labour, and selective integration into the global economy. Yet such levels of growth would not have been possible recently had Asia been as conflict-prone as it was in the decades immediately after World War II. The past thirty years have been Asia’s most prosperous period in two centuries – and also the most peaceful.

This is no coincidence. China’s success, as well as that of Asia’s other flourishing economies, was made possible by a remarkably benign international environment. Yet many fear that this environment is threatened by China’s rise. It is a profoundly nationalistic one-party authoritarian dictatorship, it has ambition to spare, and it now has the wherewithal with which to pursue its claims. It has increased defence spending dramatically over the past decade, acquiring new supersonic jet fighters and attack submarines. Currently, it is testing its first aircraft carrier.

How can the risks associated with China’s ascendancy be avoided? How should the United States respond to China’s growing power? Hugh White, departing from conventional wisdom in his thoughtful new book, argues that America should step back from its current policy and cooperate with China to manage Asia’s international order collectively. White begins by arguing that America’s military preponderance and diplomatic leadership in Asia, which he calls primacy, made the region peaceful. Normalisation of Sino–American relations was, for White, the key to this success. The problem posed by China’s rise is that it cannot accept the terms of the bargain struck in 1972. He believes that an affluent China will inevitably pursue the great power status that it gave up in the 1970s when it accepted American leadership. The problem the United States faces is that becoming a power of the first rank is clearly a fundamental imperative for the Chinese régime. So powerful is this urge, White argues, that China, pressed hard, will assert its claim. What is the United States to do when faced with such a big, powerful, ambitious state? White argues that Washington has three choices. It can withdraw, ceding leadership of the region to China. It can compete with China, a fight he thinks neither country can win – or it can share power. White argues that America can best achieve its aims, and the region remain peaceful, if China and the United States recreate nineteenth-century Europe’s concert system to manage Asia’s international relations. Asia’s concert would include Japan and India, as well as China and the United States, and they would assume collective responsibility for maintaining peace in the region. They in turn would be kept in line through the threat of collective action should one of them threaten the peace.

Whatever one thinks of his controversial conclusions, White is right to argue that the basic settings of Asia’s international order have to change. Policy-makers in Washington, Canberra, and elsewhere continue to think that the United States, by employing essentially the same strategic policy as it did in the Cold War, will continue to maintain the peace in Asia. The idea that a prosperous China will forever remain satisfied with current arrangements, in which the trade and energy flows on which it depends are ultimately at the mercy of the US Navy, is impossible to imagine. It will take steps to ensure its strategic autonomy. Indeed, it is already doing so through its naval modernisation program. White is also right to point out that, contrary to much liberal thinking, we should not assume that good economic relations will necessarily improve the political and military situation. If anything, the reverse seems to be the case. As China has become more prosperous it has become more assertive and more dissatisfied with what it believes to be the constraints imposed by an American-dominated region.

Notwithstanding these important contributions, White’s core argument has a number of less convincing elements. The first and perhaps most important is the question of motivation. What exactly would China and the United States fight over? Nothing specific is adduced in the book. White asserts that the contest will come about not because of a clash of interests, but because powerful states are, inevitably, drawn to contests over prestige, honour, and status. Here, White seems to be out of step with the foreign policy pragmatism at the top of the Chinese communist party. He is right to say that many in China fear that America seeks to curb its success, but it does not follow that China, to assuage these fears, will turn to a grand strategy of contestation with the world’s greatest military force. He asserts that nothing is more important to China than its desire for the status of a great power. Yet there is little to support this claim in anything China has done to date (or in the book). China is increasingly powerful and unquestionably ambitious for global influence, but so far China’s foreign and security policy has not been marked by efforts to take on the United States directly in a full-blown military context, and it shows no desire to convert ambition into such a risky and expensive policy.

One of the reasons why Chinese nationalism is not likely to result in a highly ambitious foreign policy lies in the simple problem of material constraint. China cannot afford a policy of overt competition with the United States now or in the medium-term future. Without question, the government’s highest priority is and will remain domestic order and economic growth. These are interdependent and are becoming harder to achieve. Corruption, nepotism, and dubious governance, plus growing unemployment caused by the current slowdown, has led to more than 90,000 reported events of mass disturbance in the past year. China now spends as much on domestic security as it does on national defence. In addition to the challenges posed by environmental decay, bad debts, and serious capital misallocation, China – if growth is to continue along its current trajectory – needs to develop more complex forms of production and distribution, an extraordinarily difficult challenge for such a large society. As a result China’s foreign dealings will continue to be heavily shaped by its domestic priorities. It will surely defend its interests, and some of these will have regional implications, such as the island disputes in the South and East China Sea, but it will not actively compete with the United States, the likely domestic price being too high.

Finally, White’s argument assumes regional peace was made only by American primacy. This view neglects the other factors on which peace depends, most obviously in this case the choices of Asian states. They opted not to arm, not to fight, not to interfere in one another’s affairs, and to get on with the business of domestic economic development. The absence of American primacy in the future does not automatically mean a retreat to rivalry, mistrust, or conflict. If Asian states make the right choices, the region’s future could be as peaceful as its recent past. While the quality of Sino–American relations will be vital to Asia’s future, the choices made elsewhere in Asia will be just as crucial.

China’s rise will continue to transform the region. The United States and its allies have to think hard about how to reconfigure their policies in response to this new world. Hugh White has done us a great service in setting out a vision of one way in which China’s rise may play out. Its greatest lesson is that neither peace nor war in Asia is inevitable; both will come about because of choices made by people, and hard thinking is needed in order to ensure that we make the right decisions.